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At the outset let me note that I am delighted to see someone of
Professor Richard Stewart's caliber taking aim at the trade and the envi-
ronment debate.' Professor Stewart's article entitled Inteinational Trade
and Environment: Lessons From the Federal Experience presents an inter-
esting and informative discussion of how legal principles developed in the
federal-type systems of the United States and the European Community can
be examined as a template for solving many of the most troubling questions
now being raised concerning the interplay between trade and the environment
at the international level. 2 While Professor Stewart's analytical structure is
informative, and in certain instances can provide answers to some of the
problems raised by conflicts between trade and the environment, I caution
against borrowing too much from the federal framework. This cautionary
note is necessary because substantially different assumptions are at work
when a federal system deals with commerce and environmental regulations,
and when the international system deals with the interplay between trade
and the environment.' This comment deals with these different assumptions
on a theoretical level and addresses how these theoretical differences can
effect substantial, real world differences in trade and environmental policies.
* Robert F. Housman is an attorney with the Center for International Environmental
Law, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the American University's Washington College of
Law. The author wishes to thank his colleagues Barry Pershkow and David Downes and the
staff of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their assistance. Any remaining errors or
omissions are the author's.
1. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From the Federal
Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329 (1992). For an excellent general discussion of the
trade and environment interplay see generally THOMAS A. WATHEN, A GUIDE TO TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
2. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1350-71.
3. See David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of
Federal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (1992). The rules domestically
are established under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. These domestic rules of commerce fit into a broader mosaic of specifically enunciated
individual social rights and obligations that generally trump our economic concerns. See Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (holding that Maine could ban importation of live bait
fish because such fish endangered Maine's wild fish population); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (holding that state could not own and operate building
within which private enterprise discriminated against African-Americans). International trade
rules are established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. At
the international level GATT lacks the social protections embodied in United States law.
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The comment closes with an alternative vision of trade and the environment
premised on mutually reinforcing trade and environmental policies-"com-
petitive sustainability."
I. MILLS v. KANT
Professor Stewart begins his analysis by observing that both trade and
environmental measures are aimed at promoting human welfare.4 He adds
that "[t]his conception rejects the position that environmental protection is
an autonomous moral duty-an independent absolute." ' Having assumed
that both trade and environmental measures serve the common good, it is
easy to apply a Millsian analysis, involving the greatest good for the greatest
number, in solving trade and environment conflicts as Professor Stewart
attempts to do.6 Under a Millsian analysis, there are no conflicting trade
and environmental agendas, only misguided regulatory efforts. Environmen-
tal measures that diminish some undefinable common good are inappropri-
ate, as are trade measures that harm the same common good by undercutting
the environmental bases of our society.
Although these simple equations are appealing, they have been highly
criticized and generally rejected. Mill's approach generally fails to take into
account the widely held belief that certain values are so central to humanity
that they must be protected even at a cost to the larger society. 7 Further,
these normative values are offended when one suggests that they may be
"priced." Many critics have described these values in terms of ethical or
categorical imperatives.8
The concept of a categorical imperative, defined by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant as "an action . . . objectively necessary in itself," without
need for reference to another end, 9 is particularly germane to the goal of
environmental protection. Assuredly much of environmental protection can
be justified, as Professor Stewart argues, as part of the improvement of
human welfare.' 0 Thus, providing potable water is a necessary component
of both improving environmental quality and standards of living for hu-
mankind. Other environmental objectives, however, are not so easily or
directly linked with meeting the immediate needs of humanity and are,
perhaps, most easily justified under ethical concepts as opposed to utilitarian
concepts.
4. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1331-32.
5. Id. at 1332.
6. See id. at 1332-45. See generally THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL
(John M. Robson et al. eds., 1963) (compiling different aspects of Mill's philosophy).
7. See generally FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 279-96 (1984) (providing critical assessment of
Mill's philosophical theories).
8. See ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 49-54 (1989) (defining
Kant's categorical imperative in terms of moral imperatives).
9. Id. at 50.
10. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1331-32.
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An excellent example of such an environmental and ethical objective is
species preservation. While the preservation of some species can be linked
to human consumptive needs or the economics of biodiversity protection,
many, if not most species have little value to humans outside of our spiritual
or ethical need to know that these animals and plants exist somewhere.,,
Consider, for example, the efforts to preserve the California condor. The
California condor has little or no economic value to humanity. However,
the United States has spent huge sums of money to ensure its continued
existence.' 2 If one uses a Millsian analysis, as Professor Stewart suggests, it
is arguable that such expenditures would be considered improper.' 3
How then can these expenditures be justified? The answer is simple:
The world is not made up of one imperative for the common good of
humanity, but rather is made up of a number of imperatives, and among
these imperatives exist both an imperative to increase human welfare and
an imperative to act as a steward over the earth's resotrces. '
4
By beginning with a Millsian premise, Professor Stewart's approach to
trade and environmental decision making necessarily attempts to balance
competing agendas (environmental benefits vs. trade benefits) in hopes of
finding the balance that creates the greatest overall benefit. A Kantian
examination of trade and the environment, however, begins with the premise
that there are at work both human welfare imperatives (which are not
always the same as trade agenda objectives) and environmental imperatives
that determine trade and environment policy. Neither of these imperatives
can be compromised. Thus, it is necessary, although somewhat more dif-
ficult, to establish a framework for developing mutually reinforcing trade
and environmental policies.
II. A KANTIAN RESPONSE
While the distinction between a world of Millsian equations and one of
Kantian imperatives appears hopelessly adrift in the impractical world of
philosophical musing, this distinction-when applied-has very real and dra-
matic effects on the manner in which one resolves trade and environment
issues.
A. Environmental Standards
I. The Role of Environmental Standards
Perhaps the most striking area of difference between Kantian and
Millsian approaches to trade and the environment is the role that each of
11. See David Ehrenfeld, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?, in BIODIVERSITY 212, 212-
16 (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988).
12. See id. at 215; Suzanne Winckler, Stopgap Measures, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.
1992, at 74, 77.
13. See Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 47, 55; Thomas Palmer, The Case for Human Beings, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 83, 83; Winckler, supra note 12, at 77.
14. See generally FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS: OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HARMONY IN THE 
2 1ST CENTURY (John van Dyke et al. eds., forthcoming 1992).
15. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1331-32.
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these approaches provides for environmental standards. One need only look
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel decision on
United States import restrictions of tuna (Tuna/Dolphin Panbl Report),
6
as well as to Professor Stewart's general approval of the decision, to see
the differences between these two approaches. 
7
Professor Stewart argues that the Tuna/Dolphin Panel may have reached
the correct result-striking down the U.S. trade embargo of Mexican tuna
harvested with the needless slaughter of dolphin-for the wrong reasons."8
Professor Stewart would have had the Panel justify its conclusion based on
the following points: 1) that "no showing was made that the [dolphin]
species in the [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] were endangered or had
fallen below sustainable levels . . . ." ;9 2) that there was no showing that
the dolphin-take quota for Mexico had any rational relation to the conser-
vation of the species;20 and 3) that the Mexican take quota was a 'moving
target' constantly adjusted in relation to the performance of the U.S.
fleet."' 2' Each of these points bears further analysis.
Regarding the point that there was no showing of endangerment,
Professor Stewart's use of endangerment as a trigger for permissible envi-
ronmental protection displays how a Millsian analysis falls to account for
essential environmental imperatives. Endangerment 22 is a standard the United
States uses as a trigger for deciding when environmental protection is so
necessary that it may trump other goals such as economic activity. 23 En-
dangerment is, however, a woefully inadequate standard for determining
when environmental protections are justified. Professor Stewart, however,
uses endangerment as the "triggering" standard for environmental protec-
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report]. Although I differ to a degree with his conclusions, Professor Dunoff's article
in this volume provides an excellent factual record from which to work when analyzing the
merits of the panel's conclusions. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with
Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1407 (1992). The author's view of the decision can be found at Robert F. Housman &
Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin
Decision, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,268 (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter Housman &
Zaelke, Collision].
17. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1357-61.
18. Id. at 1358.
19. Id. at 1359.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 defines endangered using a list of factors the
Secretary of the Interior is instructed to take into account when deciding whether to list a
species as endangered. The list includes: 1) threats to a species habitat, 2) overutilization of
the species, and 3) inadequacies of existing protection for the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(I)
(1988); see DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIS ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECnONS
AND IMPLEMENTATION 42 (1989). A more common definition of endangered species is "a species
in danger of extinction." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 431 (1976).




tion in his analysis of the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report.24 By the time a
species has reached the endangerment stage, it is highly unlikely that human
efforts, even on a herculean scale, can save the species.Y Thus, endangerment
completely fails to take into account the widely recognized precautionary
principle of environmental governance.
26
Moreover, Professor Stewart's use of endangerment and the concept of
below sustainable use levels of environmental protection reveal the hierarchy
in his analysis: Trade uber alles (Trade over all). Human activities, even
when unnecessarily destructive of the environment, such as the needless
slaughter of dolphin, should not be constrained unless the constraint is
absolutely necessary to prevent some harm to humankind. Once again a
Kantian analysis is appropriate. Why constrain economically prosperous
activities and preserve dolphin lives even if the species is not in jeopardy?
Like every economic argument, this one can be dispatched with a normative
response-that is, "I don't believe in that" or simply, "that is offensive." 27
Perhaps we preserve the dolphin because we believe it is simply immoral to
slaughter another highly intelligent species. 2
Professor Stewart's second argument in favor of the Panel's ultimate
conclusion provides that the decision is justified because the Mexican dolphin
kill quota was not "rationally" related to the conservation of the species.
29
It is important to recognize that the Mexican quota was set by figuring the
taking rate of the U.S. fleet operating under specific command and control
standards to preserve dolphin lives and then multiplying that figure by
24. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1359.
25. The plight of the dusky seaside sparrow is informative in demonstrating the inadequate
nature of the endangerment standard. Efforts to save the dusky included the spending of over
$787,000 to establish a habitat refuge for the small sparrow. Despite these efforts, the last
dusky lamentably perished twenty-five years after it was granted protection under the Endan-
gered Species Act. See Mann & Plummer, supra note 13, at 54-56.
26. See James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L &
Cop. L. REv. 1 (1991); Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and
Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEo. INT'L ENvrxL. L. REv. 303 (1992).
27. The early American economist Daniel Raymond in his 1820 treatise Thoughts on
Political Economy, explained to his readers why he had omitted any consideration of Thomas
Malthus' ideas:
Although his theory is founded upon the principles of nature, and although it is
impossible to discover any flaws in his reasoning, yet the mind instinctively revolts
at the conclusions to which he conducts it, and we are disposed to reject the theory,
even though we could give no reason.
DANIL RAYMOND, THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, quoted in HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY-
STATE ECONOMICS xi (1991).
28. See generally CmIsToPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR
MORAL PLURALiSM (1987). An even more interesting, but less recognized approach provides
that we try to protect other species because they have an independent right to life. See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 21, 62 (1991).
29. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1359.
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1.25.30 Thus, the Mexican rate was derived from the rate of dolphin
protection that could be achieved through proper harvesting controls.3 The
Mexican rate was, however, more flexible than the standard imposed on
U.S. vessels, and more lenient than the strict technology standards imposed
on U.S. vessels.1
2
While this method of setting the dolphin slaughter standard for Mexican
vessels was far from perfect, to argue that it was not "rationally" related
to the preservation of the species is far from correct. The standard was set
by using the level of species preservation that could be achieved by a
reasonable regulatory program on takings, as demonstrated by the perform-
ance of the U.S. fleet.33 To say that this method is irrational is to disregard
the jurisprudence of rationality review.34
Professor Stewart's third justification for the Panel's decision provides
that because the Mexican fleet had to meet a "moving target" that was
derived from the performance of their American competitors, one can infer
that the standard was protectionist in nature. 5 This third argument is
Professor Stewart's and the Panel's strongest one. The "moving target"
effect of setting dolphin-taking quotas under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA) 6 does have an element of protectionism from a tride point
of view, and in hind-sight, it is possible to envision a number of better
methods for imposing a standard upon Mexico.
The solution here is one of deference and leeway. In hindsight it is
almost always possible to craft a better, less-restrictive way of enacting an
environmental standard. What then becomes of these imperfect first attempts
at preservation. Under Professor Stewart's analysis it appears that in order
to protect trade rules an environmental standard must be the least trade
restrictive means of meeting the environmental goal sought.37 Following this
30. Further, the permit issued to U.S. boats included a hard ceiling for dolphin mortality.
See Housman & Zaelke, Collision, supra note 16, at 10,270. Assuming the U.S. fleet- reached
this hard taking ceiling the Mexican fleets hard standard would have been 1.25 times greater
than that standard. Id.
31. See id. Mexico's standard was calculated from the taking rate of the U.S. fleet,
which was, in turn, subject to command and control restrictions on harvesting methods. Id.
Thus, the Mexican standard was linked to the taking rate achievable through regulated
harvesting. Id.
32. See id. Mexican vessels were not required to apply specific technologies or practices,
as were required of their U.S. competitors. Id. Thus, Mexico's standard was more flexible.
Mexico's standard was 1.25 times the U.S. taking rate, thus, it was more lenient. Id.; see also
supra note 30.
33. See supra note 31.
34. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981). The rationality standard of review provides that a court shall defer to a legislature's
decision "if there is any rational basis for [the decision]." Id.
35. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1359.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
37. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1359. The least trade restrictive approach is also increasingly
finding its way into GATT jurisprudence. See Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke,
Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L.
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approach, one ex post facto trespass upon a trade rule appears sufficient
to place the environmental standard in jeopardy. Such a strict "least trade
restrictive" test, requiring a near-perfect link between an environmental
standard and its conservation goal, is simply inappropriate in the environ-
mental context. Environmental issues are highly complex and regulators
need a great degree more latitude than this least trade restrictive approach
affords them while attempting to address complexities.38 Clearly, this must
have been the approach Ambassador Carla Hills, the United States Trade
Representative, took when she testified before Congress that the MMPA
did not violate the GATT.
39
A second example even more graphically displays the differences of
approach between Millsian and Kantian views on the linkages between trade
and environment. Professor Stewart argues that "[iln principle, at least,
there is no reason why a pesticide banned" in one nation should not "be
used in a less developed country with greater assimilative capacity."' 4 Put
into the trade context, this result means that it is proper for a U.S.
manufacturer to sell pesticides banned in the United States to unsuspecting
people in the developing world. 4 To a Millsian this analysis is absolutely
correct; however, to a Kantian the very reason why such a pesticide should
be banned is one of principle, or more precisely one of ethics. Assimilative
REv. 535, 546-47 (1992) [hereinafter Housman & Zaelke, Primer]; see also General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on Importation
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, para. 74, 30 I.L.M. 1122, 1137-38 (1991); Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.27, at 1620.
38. Global warming offers an excellent example of the complexity of environmental
issues. See Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, AM. J.
INT'L L. 445, 446-47, 450-55 (1992) (discussing difficulties and uncertainties in evaluating and
responding to threat of global warming). A wide range of legal and policy responses to global
warming have been suggested. Id. at 455-87. It remains uncertain which policy approach is
"necessary" to combat global warming. Id. at 450-55. Moreover, because of the scope of the
problem, socio-economic data is insufficient to answer which response would be "least
restrictive" from an economic standpoint. Id. The end result is that if a least trade restrictive
approach to trade and environment is adopted, policy-makers could not satisfy this test in
addressing global warming.
39. Ambassador Carla A. Hills, Testimony Before the United States House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Energy and Commerce 40-41 (Sept. 24, 1990) (colloquy with Congressman
Scheuer) (marked transcript on file with author).
Congressman Scheuer: If Congress enacts the proposed law requiring tuna imports,
only from those coutries that use dolphin-safe fishing methods, could these laws
survive a GATT challenge?
Ambassador Hills: Yes, because there is an exception in the GATT for protection
of a nation's natural resources.
Id. at 40.
40. Stewart, supra note I, at 1352.
41. The current U.S. regulatory framework similarly permits a U.S. company to sell
pesticides banned at home to consumers abroad. See Alice Crowe, Breaking the Circle of
Poison: EPA 's Enforcement of Current FIFRA Export Requirements, 4 GEo. INT'L ENVTL.
L. Ray. 319, 320-21 (1992).
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capacities aside, 42 it is morally wrong to allow a pesticide shown as harmful
in the United States to be used without restriction in a developing country. 3
It is morally repugnant and ethically unacceptable to allow the inhabitants
of developing countries to be exposed to threats that the citizens of the
United States have determined are unacceptable, solely so that the industries
of the United States can profit through freer trade. 44 Moreover, if one
assumes that the value of free trade is to advance the human condition,
this result is a prime example of where the blind pursuit of freer trade is
undercutting human welfare.
2. The Use of Unilateral Trade Measures for Environmental Ends
Recognizing a separate environmental imperative also has a marked
effect on how one looks at the unilateral use of trade measures to advance
environmental objectives. Professor Stewart's analysis of unilateral environ-
mental trade measures in the areas of product standards, production process
standards, natural resource conservation measures, and restrictions on waste
trade all display more than a general distaste for the use of unilateral
environmental trade measures, and Professor Stewart argues quite stridently
against their use.
4
While few would argue that unilaterally imposed environmental trade
measures are the most desirable way of encouraging the wider implemen-
tation of environmental imperatives, they are an effective means of achieving
this objective. And many would argue that short of armed coercion, they
are the only effective international means of developing a broader interna-
tional consensus on environmental issues.46 Professor Stewart himself rec-
42. The assimilative capacity approach to environmental protection has been rejected by
the precautionary principle. See Hey, supra note 26, at 305.
43. See generally DAviD WEIR, THE BHOPAL SYNDROME: PESTICIDE MANUFACTURING AND
THE Tnnw WORLD (1986).
44. See id. at 75 (quoting Union Carbide spokesperson as saying "It is not proper for
an international corporation to put the welfare of any country in which it does business above
that of any other" in RICHARD J. BARNET & RONALD E. MULLER, GLOEAL REACH: THE POWER
OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPOATION S 16 (1974)); Alfred S. Farha, The Corporate Conscience
and Environmental Issues: Responsibility of the Multinational Corporation, 10 Nw. J. Irr'L
L. & Bus. 379, 394 (1990); David B. Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International
Environmental Law, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 547 (1992) (discussing need for "global citizen-
ship" in international law). Alfred S. Farha noted that:
[A] truly responsible company should maintain the same standards of environmental
protection anywhere it operates in the world. . . .There is no reason to treat a plant
in a less developed country any differently than one in Western Europe or North
America. By definition, a multinational corporation's responsibility is global, and
its standard of care for the environment must be uniformly applied wherever its
operations exist.
Farha, supra, at 344.
45. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1351-61.
46. Cf Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C.
ENVtl. AM. L. REv. 213, 218-19 (1991) (discussing time delay in crafting international
environmental agreements) (Mr. Sand was Principal Legal Officer for United Nations Confer-
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ognizes the role that trade sanctions, or the threat of such sanctions, have
played in preserving hawksbill sea turtles, ending whaling, and ending the
highly destructive practice of driftnet fishing.47 He fails, however, to ac-
knowledge that the use of trade sanctions by the United States has also led,
in the Tuna/Dolphin case, to an international agreement to preserve the
dolphin in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean-the area where they are
most at risk from fishing practices.48 Simply put, when all else fails,
unilateral trade measures are an important and necessary impetus for the
international community to act on environmental threats. Absent the ability
of nations to put such sanctions to use, it is highly unlikely that the
international community, described by Philip Allott as "post-feudal society
encased in amber," ' 49 would have responded to these threats in time. 0 Had
unilateral environmental trade sanctions not been available, it is highly
probable that the only place a whale or a hawksbill turtle could be found
today would be stuffed in a museum.-"
3. The Multilateral Use of Environmental Trade Measures
While Professor Stewart would provide a high degree of deference for
international standards aimed at preserving the global commons, he is not
so generous toward other multilaterally agreed-upon environmental measures
and standards.12 Although he provides that "group standards should, ceteris
paribus, enjoy greater deference than unilateral ones," he goes on to state
that the multilateral character of an international environmental standard
should not automatically validate a trade restriction, because such an
international effort could be nothing more than a greenwashed attempt at
cartelization.5 Under Professor Stewart's analysis it seems that all trade
provisions in multilateral environmental agreements, even those as important
as the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion, would be subject to review
under the provisions of GATT.4 The provisions of these vital agreements
would come clothed only in a higher degree of deference than that accorded
unilateral measures. Once again, trade uber alles.
ence on Environment and Development). See generally Developments in the Law-International
Environmental LaW, 104 HARv. L. Rv. 1487, 1550-66 (1991) (discussing implementation and
enforcement of international environmental agreements).
47. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1351-61.
48. See John Maggs, Mexico, Venezuela and U.S. Reach Tuna-Dolphin Accord, J. COM.,
June 18, 1992, at A3; Michael Parrish, Pact May Stop Dolphin Deaths in Tuna Fishing, L.A.
TIuEs, June 17, 1992, at Al.
49. Hunter, supra note 44, at 551-52 (quoting PHILIP ALLOrT, EUNOMIA: NEw ORDER
FOR A NEW WoRLD 238 (1990)).
50. See Sand, supra note 46, at 236; Hunter, supra note 44.
51. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental 'and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD
ECON. 335, 349 (1992).
52. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1361-67.
53. Id. at 1362.
54. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
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Simply put, this approach is, from an environmental perspective, un-
tenable. The protections afforded by these multilateral agreements have been
hard won gains and the environmental community will not sit quietly by
while these provisions are undercut by trade dispute panels." Surely, the
implementation of these agreements by nation-states cannot be allowed to
become a safe harbor for trade protectionism; however, that statement is a
far cry from making the provisions of these agreements subject to trade
rules and challenges. Moreover, the international community has repeatedly
stated that multilateral agreements on environmental issues are the preferred
approach to environmental protection . 6 If multilateral agreements are truly
the way that the international community wishes to deal with environmental
threats, a better balance must be struck. Indeed, I believe that if one reads
Professor John Jackson's excellent article in this same volume, one will
find that there is a better balance already proposed. 57
B. The Role of Growth in Trade and the Environment
A Millsian approach to trade and the environment does, however,
provide a helpful analytical framework in determining what is the proper
role of growth in the trade and the environment equation. Professor Stewart
argues that the growth attendant to trade necessarily raises our standards
of living which, in turn, allows us to buy greater levels of environmental
protection-"trickle down environmentalism. ' 58 Moreover, it is important
to note that Professor Stewart is not alone in this belief; an entire school
of thought sincerely believes in this paradigm.5 9
Once again the assumptions upon which these beliefs are premised bear
careful consideration. One must question whether enhanced trade in and of
itself enhances the greater human condition. Herman Daly, the noted World
Bank Senior Economist, has written quite eloquently on this topic. He has
noted that "[t]he effort to overcome poverty through further growth in
scale of throughput is self-defeating once we have reached the point where
growth in scale increases environmental costs faster than it increases pro-
duction benefits. Beyond this point, which we have in all likelihood already
55. From a purely political standpoint, it is unlikely that a party would challenge an
agreement as important as the Montreal Protocol, however, the importance of these agreements
is such that their fates should not be left to the vaguaries of international politics.
56. See, e.g., Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 6.3, at 1623; see also
Daniel C. Esty, New Linkages and Policy Challenges, ENvTL. FORUM, July-Aug. 1992, at 25,
26.
57. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence
or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227 (1992).
58. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1329. The phrase "trickle down environmentalism" was
coined, I believe, by my colleague Professor David Wirth.
59. See Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, Paper Presented at the Conference on the U.S.-Mexico Free




passed, further growth makes us poorer, not richer."' 6 Simply put, if the
goal of enhanced trade is to raise standards Of living through growth, the
means may not fit the ends.
Raising standards of living will not be achieved through blind growth
for growth's sake, it can only be achieved through "clean growth"-growth
achieved through increased efficiency as opposed to increased consumption.
In effect, clean growth will require us to do more with less. For example,
Patagonia, the leading outdoor equipment manufacturer, in response to an
internal full life-cycle environmental audit of their products recently decided
that it would limit the number of different styles of ski pants they manu-
facture. 6' Patagonia's rationale was simple; all of their products come at
some environmental costs, and limiting the number of styles of ski pants
they make would eliminate some of these costs. People did not need more
than two styles of ski pants from which to choose. 62 They should be
applauded for this commitment to the future.
63
III. A NEW VISION FOR TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: COMPETITIVE
SUSTAINA3ILITY
There is, however, one area where I am in substantial agreement with
Professor Stewart. Markets (read: the global economy) must be pressed into
service if we are to both enhance environmental quality and improve the
human condition. Paul Hawken, the founder of Smith & Hawken, one of
the leading environmentally conscious companies, summarized this necessity
in the following manner, "[b]usiness is the only mechanism on the planet
today powerful enough to produce the changes necessary to reverse global
environmental and social degradation. '" 64 Hawken stated that "[t]here is an
economy of degradation, which is one objective way to describe industri-
alization, and there is a restorative economy that is nascent but real, whose
potential size is as great as the entire world economy is today."
65
The difficulty is that the market will not effect this positive change
unless governments play a role in creating both market incentives for clean
60. Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Obstacle of
Free Trade, Transcript of a Presentation Given at the Loyola Law School 9-10 (Feb. 29, 1992).
(on file with author).
61. See Patagonia Catalog, Winter 1992, at 2.
62. Id.
63. In discussing Patagonia's decision to limit its own growth Yvon Chouinard, founder
of the company, noted eloquently:
Last year, when we decided to limit our growth, we also committed ourselves to a
life-span of a hundred years. A company that intends to be around that long will
live within its resources, care for its people, and do everything it can to satisfy its
community of customers. This direction is pleasing to us as a company, just as the
lines of the Shaker box are pleasing to the eye. It's a gifi to have survived twenty
years and a gift to come back to where we ought to be.
Id. Well put.
64. Paul Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce, INC., Apr. 1992, at 93, 94.
65. Id.
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growth and market disincentives for unsustainable growth." Here again, we
turn to the role trade plays in creating these incentives and disincentives.
Trade's rules function like any other code, providing incentives for some
economic activities and disincentives for others. Thus, trade rules must be
crafted so that their built-in incentives and disincentives function to en-
courage restorative economic growth. "Competitive sustainability" provides
a theoretical framework for thinking about economic and ecological systems
that are mutually reinforcing. One of the principle goals of competitive
sustainability is that environmental standards, both domestic and interna-
tional, must be harmonized upward. The theory further provides that the
best mechanism for encouraging this upward harmonization is to use com-
petitive forces to create a level playing field for commerce at consistently
higher levels of environmental and social protections through a set of
incentives that reward the cleanest and most efficient economic actors for
their efforts. A number of changes are needed in trade rules to allow for
a system of competitive sustainability to develop. 67 Certain of these changes
are discussed below; however, the following examples are not exclusive.
A. Environmental Countervailing Duties
Under the current system of trade rules, no acceptable way exists for a
country to force products entering its markets to internalize the environ-
mental costs attendant to their production." Thus, companies operating in
nations that lack appropriate environmental laws or enforcement receive
what amounts to a pollution subsidy.6 9 The environmental costs from their
66. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 674 (1990);
Michael Weisskopf, Oil Recycling Success Provides Support for Differing Messages, WASH.
POST, Oct. 26, 1992, at A8.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 68-80.
68. See Housman & Zaelke, Primer, supra note 37, at 556; GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 19 (1992) (advance copy)
[hereinafter GATT SECRETARIAT].
69. A 1991 report by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic
Development, an independent research and educational organization of more than two hundred
business executives and educators provides:
There are significant differences among countries in expenditures on pollution control.
According to a 1985 OECD study, expenditures on pollution control as a percentage
of GDP were higher in the United States than in any other OECD country for
which data were available. It is likely that even greater differences exist between the
industrialized and less developed countries, and these discrepancies inevitably con-
tribute to differences in production costs. Although the effect on U.S. international
competitiveness of our relatively high environmental standards is minor for most
industries, it is substantial in some sectors, such as nonferrous metals.
Given the effect on production costs of environmental regulations, the question
arises whether the concept of unfair trade practices should include the failure of a
country to maintain environmental standards or the subsidization by a government
of private-sector pollution-abatement costs.
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production processes are passed downstream to other users of resources,
such as local fishermen who find that the lakes and rivers are poisohed and
no longer sustain life,70 and to the general public, who pay higher personal
and economic health care costs from diseases such as respiratory illness.7'
For example, studies show that 140,000 Americans alive today will get
cancer from exposure to toxic air emissions.
7 2
The competitive advantage held by companies producing products in
nations lacking enforcement of acceptable environmental laws could be
eliminated by .allowing nations to apply a countervailing duty on these
products, equal in amount to the environmental subsidy the products receive,
when they enter the importing nation's market.73 Detractors of this approach
argue that the system would be difficult to administer, it would lend itself
to protectionism, and it would allow the developed world to close its markets
to products from the developing world, which could not bear the costs of
heightened environmental protections.7 4 •
A properly designed system of countervailing diuties could, however,
address each of these concerns. For example, developing countries have
very real concerns that such duties will serve to exclude them from developed
world markets. The standard for finding that a developing country industry
receives a pollution subsidy, however, could take into account differences
in the level of development in the country-of-origin. Moreover, the revenues
collected from such a system could be returned to developing countries in
the form of technology assistance that would allow them to become greener
economic players.
7 1
Trade rules should be changed to provide a framework to allow countries
to impose such duties in an internationally agreed upon manner. Moreover,
such a system must also recognize that these trade "sticks" should be
(1991) (citing OECD, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS: RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS 50 (1985)); see Kenneth S. Komoroski, The Failure of
Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT?, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189,
209 (1988); Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Recognizing and Countervailing Environmental Subsidies,
26 INT'L LAW. 763, 780 (1992); Michael Prieur, Environmental Regulations and Foreign Trade
Aspects, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 85, 86 (1987).
70. See VITAL SIGNS 1992, at 30 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1992).
71. See Chris A. Wold & Durwood Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable Development and
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 563 (1992) (noting that air pollution
costs Hungary 214 million dollars per year in health care costs) (citing'INSTITUTE FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HUNGARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 33 (Mikl~s Bulla ed., 1981)).
72. THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXCHANGE, WHAT WORKS: AIR POLLUTION SOLUTIONS 6 (1992).
73. See Plofchan, supra note 69, at 780.
74. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1355.
75. Such a proposal has already been advanced by Senator David Boren in the Inter-
national Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See generally
Senator David L. Boren, Prepared Statement on the International Pollution Deterrence Act
of 1991 in the Senate Finance Comm. (Oct. 25, 1991).
13851992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1373
accompanied by trade "carrots"-incentives for positive actions. 76 Absent
such a change, the United States should enact environmental countervailing
duty provisions that provide for unilateral sanctions in order to force the
evolutibn of the GATT. 77 Further, although a multilateral approach is always
preferable, the proposed GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement 78 arguably
would, if accepted, institutionalize internationally the unilateral approach
of the United States section 301.79 Section 301, which already covers unfair
labor practices could serve as a model for U.S. environmental countervailing
duty provisions.80
B. The Product-Cradle to Grave
Similarly, under existing international trade law, a party is prohibited
from enacting standards that set requirements upon the production process
method by which an imported product is made.8 This limitation renders
any attempt by a country to use trade measures to encourage companies to
76. See Craig Obey, Note, Trade Incentives and Environmental Reform: The Search for
a Suitable Incentive, 4 GEO. INT'L ENvmT. L. REV. 421, 441-45 (1992).
77. See Robert Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil,
in AGGRESSIVE UNmATERAISMm 113, 116-53 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990)
(discussing "justified disobedience" as allowing for violations of GATT in order to force its
evolution).
78. Understanding- on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Under
Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/W/IA (Dec. 20, 1991). ,
79. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement:
Internationalization or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795, 799 (1992). Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, enables private parties in the United States to
petition the United States Trade Representative to initiate an investigation of foreign government
policies, practices, and actions that violate a trade agreement or are otherwise in violation of
section 301's provisions. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-
43 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2411 (1988)). One of the most critical
amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 was the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-76 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
2411-2420 (1988)). If this investigation finds that the foreign practice violated a trade agreement
or was otherwise inconsistent with section 301, and burdened U.S. commerce then the United
States Trade Representative must take responsive actions. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988); see
also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Unilateral Action to Open Foreign Markets: The
Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises, 22 INT'L LAW. 1197 (1988). If the foreign government
refuses to eliminate the offensive practice within statutorily specified time frames the United
States Trade Representative must take retaliatory actions against the foreign government. See
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988); see also Alan 0. Sykeg, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of
Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J.
301 (1990).
80. See Charnovitz, supra note 51, at 341.
81. See GATT, supra note 3, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-08; see
also Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.12-.15, at 1617-18; GATT SECRETARIAT
supra note 68, at 8-11; Housman & Zaelke, Primer, supra note 37, at 540-41; Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries: International Economic
Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MicH. L. REV. 859, 893-901 (1972).
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adopt more sustainable production and disposal processes inconsistent with
the GATT.
In order to encourage cleaner growth and to require environmental cost
internalization, countries must be allowed to ensure that the full life cycle
of imported products (from cradle to grave) meets the standards applicable
to similar domestic goods. Thus, the term "product" as used in GATT
Article III jurisprudence must be rethought to include the production and
disposal cycles of the product as it appears at market.
C. Enhancing Public Participation
Public participation is vital to informed decision making, particularly
with regard to environmental protection. 82 Under existing international trade
agreements, citizens are completely excluded from participating in the con-
duct of international trade disputes."3 Individuals and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are not allowed to present information into the
process, nor are they allowed to receive information, such as the submissions
to a panel, from the process. 4 The end result is that no assurances exist in
these dispute processes that the governments are acting in their citizens best
interest. 5 Simply put, under the current framework individuals who are
harmed by trade and environmental policies have no recourse. 6 Moreover,
these limits on public participation not only preclude environmental NGOs
from participating, they also preclude the participation of competitors
harmed by pollution subsidies-the parties who have the competitive desire
and the legal and technical capabilities to drive upward harmonization.
The rules of international trade must be changed to allow affected
parties to play a much greater role in the trade dispute process. This will
necessarily entail the right of these parties to obtain access to the information
82. See Sheldon Kamienieki, Political Mobilization, Agenda Building and International
Environmental Policy, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 339, 347-49 (1991); Wold & Zaelke, supra note 71, at
595; David R. Downes, Don't Blame It on Rio, ENVrL. FORUM, May-June 1992, at 17, 20
("If democracy means that those affected by political action participate in decisions about it,
then the ultimate goal is a global and intergenerational system of law that is integrated into
world politics, economics, and ecology").
83. See Housman & Zaelke, Primer, supra note 37, at 558.
84. Id.
85. For example, in the 'infamous Tuna/Dolphin case, the United States government
refused for more than a decade to impose the trade sanctions required under law against
Mexico. See Housman & Zaelke, Collision, supra note 16, at 10,271. Only after a lawsuit was
brought by an NGO and a court order was issued and upheld on appeal did the United States
government enforce the law. Id. This same United States government, which had worked
diligently with the Mexicans to avoid the imposition of trade sanctions, then had to defend
these same sanctions before a trade panel. Id. This is not to imply that the United States
Trade Representative's Office acted improperly during the Tuna/Dolphin case; it does, however,
display that the potential for abuse exists.
86. See WILLIAM 0. DouO.As, PoINTs OF REBELLION 63 (1970) (quoting Chief Justice
John Marshall stating "It]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury").
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developed within the context of trade disputes and to submit information
directly into the dispute process.
CONCLUSION
Professor Stewart's Millsian approach to trade and the environment,
applying the lessons learned from federal systems to this complex interna-
tional policy sphere, is an important contribution to the trade and the
environment dialogue. The Millsian approach, however, puts economic
values too greatly at odds with normative values. In such an adversarial
dialectic, the end result of every MilIsian equation is that one or the other
must lose.
A better approach would consider that higher standards of living through
enhanced trade and environmental protection are necessarily interconnected
and that any attempt to untie the Gordian knot of trade and the environment
cannot compromise the important goals of either of these imperatives. This
Kantian approach recognizes that mutually reinforcing trade and environ-
mental policies are not a luxury, but a necessity. Competitive sustainability
offers a framework for such mutually reinforcing policies.
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